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While ARCH/GARCH equations have been widely used to model ﬁnancial market data, formal
explanations for the sources of conditional volatility are scarce. This paper presents a model with
the property that standard econometric tests detect ARCH/GARCH eﬀects similar to those found
in asset returns. We use evolutionary game theory to describe how agents endogenously switch
among diﬀerent forecasting strategies. The agents evaluate past forecast errors in the context of
an optimizing model of asset pricing given heterogeneous agents. We show that the prospects for
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driving force leading to the appearance of ARCH/GARCH in the data.
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919-966-4986 (fax), parke@email.unc.edu.The goal of volatility analysis must ultimately be to explain the causes of volatility.
While time series structure is valuable for forecasting, it does not satisfy our need to
explain volatility. .... Thus far, attempts to ﬁnd the ultimate cause of volatility are not
very satisfactory.
- Robert Engle (2001)
Few models are capable of generating the type of ARCH one sees in the data. .... Most
of these studies are best summarized with the adage that “to get GARCH you need to
begin with GARCH.”
- Adrian Pagan (1996)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
ARCH/GARCH models have been used to describe the behavior of inﬂation, interest rates and
exchange rates1, and they have become the standard tool for analyzing returns in ﬁnancial mar-
kets2. Despite the widespread empirical successes of ARCH/GARCH models, discovering under-
lying mechanisms that lead to time-varying volatility has proved to be an elusive goal.
We propose that time-varying volatility is a natural feature of models with forward-looking
agents. Our key condition is that agents are not constrained by assumption to agree on a single
expectation. Instead, we apply recent developments in evolutionary game theory to explain how
forward-looking agents might choose among diﬀering forecasts. We assume that information arrives
uniformly over time so that changes in volatility are due entirely to agents’ behavior. Furthermore,
our agents do not set out simply to invent ARCH. They use ideas drawn from the literature on
rational expectations to choose among forecasts based on what they perceive to be fundamentals.
We establish conditions under which ARCH eﬀects will be a normal feature of the resulting data.
The mechanism generating time-varying volatility has a general formulation. Evolutionary
game theory describes how fractions xt =( x1,t,...,x k,t) of the population using forecasting strategies
st =( s1,t,...,s k,t) evolve according to the performances of the strategies. An asset pricing model
then shows how the price yt depends on the fractions xt and other information Θt so that
1Bollerslev (1986) examines inﬂation dynamics with a GARCH model. Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) use the
ARCH in mean model to study yield curve issues. Diebold and Nerlove (1989) use a multivariate ARCH model to
analyze exchange rates.
2Engle (2001) provides a recent account of the methodology.
1yt = y(xt,Θt). The fractions xt are taken to be known and ﬁxed before yt is realized. We divide
Θt into information Ωt available to agents before yt is realized and all other information εt.T h e
model generating yt can then be written in the form
yt = y(xt,Ωt,εt). (1)
After agents observe yt, they choose strategies for period t +1 ,u p d a t i n gxt using a procedure of
the form
xt+1 = g(xt,y t,Ωt). (2)
Given this structure, the variance of the asset price can generally be written as
V (yt|xt,Ωt,Σt)=h(xt,Ωt,Σt), (3)
where Σt is a measure of the volatility of εt. To clarify the source of conditional heteroskedasticity,
we assume that Σt is constant. The variance of yt will not, however, be constant if it depends on
the mix xt of agents’ strategies.
We demonstrate that ARCH eﬀects can appear to be important in an empirical model for yt if
the econometrician does not take into account heterogeneity. A typical representative agent model
for yt, for example, would omit xt from (1) leaving
yt = y0 (Ωt,εt).
The corresponding representative agent model of the conditional variance (3) would reduce to
V 0(yt|Ωt,Σt)=h0 (Ωt,Σt). (4)
Standard econometric tests may well diagnose that the representative agent model (4) leaving out
the fractions xt has ARCH, making it appear to be necessary to account for changes over time
in Σt.W e p r o v i d e s p e c i ﬁc simulations that illustrate how apparent ARCH can be an artifact of
ignoring heterogeneous expectations.
2These ARCH eﬀects take place in a standard mean-variance optimization model of asset prices
extended to an environment with heterogeneous agents. Brock and Hommes (1998) develop the
theoretical basis for this model. They apply the model in an environment with multiple trader
types who use an assortment of linear forecasting rules. Brock, Hommes and Wagener (2005)
and Gaunersdorfer, Hommes, and Wagener (2003) extend these results.3 Other studies with het-
erogeneous expectations include Chiarella and He (2002), DeGrauwe (1993) and DeLong, Shleifer,
Summers and Waldmann (1990). Our study diﬀers in that we focus on agents pursuing goals set
forth in the literature on rational expectations.
Our speciﬁc example features agents choosing among three forecasting strategies. A fundamen-
talist uses only expected future dividends to form his forecast. A mystic uses fundamentals, but
may also experiment with other extraneous information because, perhaps, there is some uncertainty
about what belongs in the fundamentals. A reﬂectivist incorporates all available information about
agents’ expectations, calculating the average expectation using population share weights.
We implement the procedure for updating agents’ choices of forecasting strategies (2) by having
agents switch to strategies that have exhibited lower squared forecast errors. The switching
probabilities are determined by the evolutionary dynamic of Hofbauer and Weibull (1996). That
dynamic allows for a nonlinear weighting function in the forecast evaluation. We add an important
dimension to our analysis by using the nonlinearity to parameterize how aggressively agents switch
forecasts.
Standard econometric tests applied to simulated data conﬁrm that the extent of ARCH eﬀects
depends on agent aggressiveness and on the variance of the potential extraneous element that
might enter the mystical forecast. If the latter variance is small relative to the variance of the
fundamentals or if agents are not very aggressive, then the asset price tends to follow fundamentals
nearly all the time. If the variance of the extraneous element is larger and agents are more
aggressive, then asset prices show occasional bubble behavior and both Engle’s (1982) test for
ARCH and estimates of a GARCH(1,1) model support the conclusion that the data can be described
as ARCH/GARCH for many of the simulations.
The role of heterogeneity has been noted in other related contexts with boundedly rational
3Hommes (2006) surveys these and related models.
3forecasting strategies. Lux and Marchesi (2000) construct an asset market with fundamentalists
and two diﬀerent types of chartists, who respond to trends in the data. The switching probabilities
between the two strategies are determined by a modiﬁed discrete choice model that allows for slug-
gish adjustment. Their model shows that switching between strategies can produce ARCH eﬀects
for certain parameter values. Föllmer, Horst and Kirman (2005) show the existence of bubbles,
but also show the existence of limiting distributions of asset prices in a discrete choice model with
forecasting strategies put forward by ‘gurus’ that could include chartists and fundamentalists. In
a similar framework, Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2005) derive theoretical results indicating the
presence of bubbles and volatility clustering.
LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer (1999) study the time series features of a simulated asset market
and show the existence of ARCH eﬀects and many other features of ﬁnancial market data. They use
a computational approach with many trader types introduced throughout the simulation according
to a genetic algorithm. They ﬁnd that the evidence of ARCH eﬀects is much stronger in an
environment they term fast learning than it is given slow learning.
The focus in this paper on the possibility of heterogeneous forecasts stands in contrast to those
who argue that martingale solutions should be ruled out according to criteria such as transversality
(see Cochrane (2001) p. 27), minimum state variables (McCallum (1983, 1997)), and expecta-
tional stability (Evans and Honkapohja (2001)).4 In our context, the importance of the martingale
solutions depends on the parameter values and, while convergence to a single expectation is pos-
sible under some conditions, we establish the range of parameter values for which the martingale
solutions are an important feature. Using another approach that deﬁnes stability according to
rationalizability of strategies, Evans and Guesnerie (2003) show convergence to the minimum state
variables solution with homogeneous agents, but they also show instability in the case of heteroge-
neous agents.
The literature on convergence to rational expectations along the lines of least squares learning
(Grandmont (1998) and Marcet and Sargent (1989), for example) is also concerned with multiple
rational expectations equilibria. Woodford (1990) and Howitt and McAfee (1992) establish the
4Evans and Honkapohja (2001) also discuss the possibility that bubble solutions might be learnable if agents use
as u ﬃciently complicated model to form expectations.
4possibility of learning sunspot equilibria given accidental correlations between sunspots and fun-
damentals.5 While these papers focus on agents learning model parameters over time, our agents
know the parameters and are choosing among forecasts constructed from the multiple solutions to
the model.
den Haan and Spear (1998) explain conditional volatility in real interest rate ﬂuctuations.
They construct an optimizing model where agents hold savings in the form of bonds. Agents are
heterogeneous, as in the present paper, and receive idiosyncratic shocks. Volatility clustering arises
due to borrowing constraints that vary across the business cycle.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the asset pricing model with
heterogeneous agents. Section 3 and 4 describe the diﬀerent forecasting strategies and their squared
forecast errors. Section 5 shows how agents’ choices of strategies evolve over time. Section
6 establishes how convergence of expectations depends on assumptions about agents’ beliefs and
willingness to consider new information. Section 7 describes the simulation methodology used in
the remainder of the paper. Section 8 provides examples and compares the simulations to some
stylized facts. Section 9 presents econometric analysis of the simulations using a GARCH(1,1)
model. Section 10 concludes.
2 Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents
This section develops an optimizing model of asset pricing with heterogeneous agents based on
Brock and Hommes (1998). They extend a standard asset pricing model to the situation where
agents can have heterogeneous beliefs about future prices. Agents are myopic, mean-variance
optimizers who can choose between a risky asset and a riskless asset with gross rate of return R.
An agent’s wealth Wt evolves according to
Wt+1 = RWt +( yt+1 + dt+1 − Ryt)zt,
where yt is the price of the risky asset, dt is the dividend payment, and zt is the number of shares
of the risky asset purchased by the agent at time t. The asset price and dividend process are
5Timmermann (1994) argues that feedback from lagged variables into dividends rules out rational bubbles.
5stochastic so agents do not have precise knowledge of yt+1 or dt+1 when making decisions about
zt.
Agents may have heterogeneous expectations. For an agent of type j,l e tfj,t (Wt+1) be the
expectation of wealth conditional on the information available at time t,a n dl e tVj,t (Wt+1) be the
perceived variance of Wt+1. Assume that the demand for shares zj,t by agents of type j maximizes
fj,t (Wt+1) −
a
2
Vj,t (Wt+1), (5)
where the parameter a denotes the level of risk aversion. If the perceived conditional variance
Vj,t (yt+1 + dt+1 − Ryt) for per share excess returns is the same constant σ2
r for all agent types,
then the demand for shares by agents of type j is given by
zj,t =
µ
1
aσ2
r
¶
fj,t (yt+1 + dt+1 − Ryt).
Summing the demand over the n types of agents, where the fraction of the population of type j is
xj,t, and equating total demand to a constant supply zs per investor yields the following condition
for the price of the risky asset
Ryt =
n X
j=1
xj,tfj,t (yt+1 + dt+1) − C, (6)
where C = aσ2
rzs functions as a risk premium. This equation is analogous to Brock and Hommes’
(1998) equation (2.7).
We retain their assumption that the conditional variance σ2
r of the per share excess returns is
constant. If agents were to expect bubbles, σ2
r could be higher, but the results remain the same for
any constant σ2
r. More sophisticated agents could try to estimate an ARCH model every period
to anticipate changes in volatility, causing σ2
r to vary over time and across agents, but in order
to focus exclusively on ARCH eﬀects that arise from heterogeneity in the forecasting strategies,
we rule out such behavior. It seems likely that variation in σ2
r would add to rather than reduce
conditional volatility.
The pricing condition for agents with homogeneous rational expectations provides a useful
6benchmark for asset pricing given heterogeneous expectations (6). If all agents were of a single
type, then yt would follow
Ryt = Et (yt+1 + dt+1) − C (7)
The bubble-free solution to this equation is yt = y∗
t,w h e r e
y∗
t =
∞ X
s=1
αsEtdt+s −
µ
α
1 − α
¶
C (8)
and α = R−1. The self-fulﬁlling nature of expectations, however, admits the class of solutions
yt = y∗
t + α−tmt, (9)
where mt is a martingale that we will express as mt = mt−1 +ηt for an i.i.d., mean zero stochastic
process ηt with variance σ2
η. Requiring the variance of ηt to be constant is not necessary to satisfy
(7), but we want to rule out conditional volatility in the martingale innovation or in the dividend
innovation as sources of conditional volatility in the asset price.
To focus attention on the eﬀects of choosing among forecasting strategies, we retain the key
underlying assumption of Brock and Hommes (1998) that agents have common beliefs about the
dividend process so that y∗
t is common knowledge. We also take the realized martingale mt−1 to
be common knowledge although agents will disagree about whether it should be used to predict yt.
3S t r a t e g i e s
The organization of this section and the next reﬂects the sequential process agents follow to deter-
mine yt.T h e y b e g i n p e r i o d t with the vector of fractions xt already determined. Information Ωt
then arrives, and they compute forecasts for period t +1 . These forecasts, given the asset pricing
model in the previous section, determine their share positions and, hence, the price yt.O n c e yt is
realized, they can compute forecast errors for the forecasts made in period t − 1. They then use
an evolutionary game theory mechanism to decide on fractions xt+1 for period t +1 .
This section postulates three possible strategies for forecasting the asset price yt.T h e v e c t o r o f
7fractions following the three strategies will be denoted xt =( βt,γt,λt). The forecasting strategies
diﬀer in two ways. Agents are not immediately certain whether newly proposed types of information
are fundamental or extraneous, and they diﬀer in the extent to which they attempt to exploit
knowledge of other agents’ expectations.
Af r a c t i o nγt of the population uses (8) to form the fundamentalist forecast
fγ,t(yt+1)=Ety∗
t+1 (10)
Agents following fundamentals base their forecast solely on expected future dividends, ruling out
forecasts that involve the martingale mt. A fraction λt of the population uses a mystical forecast
fλ,t(yt+1)=Ety∗
t+1 + α−t−1mt (11)
based on a martingale solution of the form (9). The basis for allowing agents to follow a martingale
s o l u t i o ni s ,o fc o u r s e ,ac r i t i c a li s s u e .
Some researchers exclude such solutions on the basis of a transversality condition or similar
criterion (see Cochrane (2001) or other references in the introduction). These arguments require
strong assumptions about the information available to the agents. Recognizing that mt is, in fact,
a martingale and not stationary data is a classic econometric problem with the characteristic that
agents cannot know with certainty, on the basis of a ﬁnite data sample, that mt is nonstationary
and that a transversality condition is violated. Furthermore, the predictive properties of mt may
well be uncertain in ﬁnite samples. Later results in this paper show that, given the randomness of
sample correlations, forecasting strategies based on extraneous martingales can outperform other
strategies over the short term. Therefore, while agents may indeed rule out martingales in the
long run, ruling out martingales in ﬁnite data samples is another matter.
A martingale might well appeal to agents trying to follow fundamentals. Suppose mt is a
new idea (the impact of the Internet on commerce or the inﬂuence of sunspots6, for example) that
might or might not be a revision to the set of fundamentals. If mt is in fact a spurious martingale,
6Typically, sunspot equilibria can be constructed in a model with martingale solutions. See Farmer (1999, Chapter
10) for a full discussion.
8agents attempting to choose between (10) and (11) will eventually reject (11), but the process of
evaluating and rejecting (11) on the basis of empirical evidence may take some time. We diverge
here from the sunspot literature in that we assume that only a portion of the agents adopt the
sunspot forecast while others stick with the fundamentalist forecast.
For our third forecasting strategy, agents give primary attention to anticipating the choices of
others in a manner reminiscent of Keynes’ (1935) “beauty contest” interpretation of predicting
stock prices. We refer to this third forecast as the reﬂective forecast b e c a u s ei ts i m p l yr e ﬂects
the views of others without attempting to consider the intrinsic value of the asset. Formally, we
assume that the reﬂective forecast is an average of the other two forecasts, weighted according to
their relative popularity. That is,
fβ,t(yt+1)=ntfλ,t(yt+1)+( 1− nt)fγ,t(yt+1), (12)
where
nt =
λt
λt + γt
.
The reﬂective forecast can be expressed in terms of fundamentals and the martingale by substituting
(10) and (11) into (12) to obtain
fβ,t(yt+1)=Ety∗
t+1 + α−t−1ntmt. (13)
The martingale thus inﬂuences the reﬂective forecast to the extent that the fraction nt of the
other agents are following the mystical forecast. If nt =0or nt =1 , then the reﬂective forecast
will numerically match the dominating forecast.7 The reﬂective forecast (13) diﬀers from perfect
foresight because y∗
t+1 − Ety∗
t+1 and α−t−1nt+1mt+1 − α−t−1ntmt are not known in period t.T h e
reﬂective forecast brings to the system the notion of taking into account the expectations of other
agents, which is an important element of rational expectations.
The motive for agents to include the reﬂective forecast among the strategies they consider might
be some instinctive belief in the possible merit of averaging across available forecasts. An average
7The reﬂective forecast is not well-deﬁned for λt = γt =0 , but, as we explain in Section 6, that case is not the
focus of this paper.
9is an obvious statistic to compute so it would not be be surprising if agents did the calculation.
In the next section we give this intuition a mathematical foundation by showing that, in every
period, the payoﬀ to the reﬂective forecast is greater than or equal to the average payoﬀ to the
other forecasts. Unless the fundamentalist and mystical forecasts happen to be numerically equal
(because mt =0 ), the reﬂective forecast is guaranteed to have an above average payoﬀ.8
The information requirements for these strategies diﬀer somewhat, but to make switching strate-
gies possible we assume that all agents have access to the same information, including expected
dividends and the martingale. While the knowledge of the fractions βt, γt,a n dλt needed to
implement the reﬂective forecast might come from direct observation of other agents, that is not
necessary. The fractions change over time according to updating equations, given below as (24),
that are functions of the payoﬀs. Given that the agents know the payoﬀsa n das t a r t i n gp o i n tf o r
the fractions, they can recursively calculate the fr a c t i o n so v e rt i m ej u s ta sw ed oi no u rs i m u l a t i o n s
later in this paper.9
Knowledge of the fractions βt, γt,a n dλt is easier to justify under the alternative interpretation
that there are many agents, but only three forecasters. Only the forecasters need to know how to
calculate a forecast. The agents simply choose among the available forecasts. Föllmer, Horst, and
Kirman (2005) make a similar distinction between agents and “gurus.”
The realized asset price (6) can be written as
yt = α(γtfγ,t(yt+1)+λtfλ,t(yt+1)+βtfβ,t(yt+1)+Etdt+1 − C).
Using (12) to express γtfγ,t(yt+1)+λtfλ,t(yt+1) in terms of fβ,t(yt+1) yields
yt = α(fβ,t(yt+1)+Etdt+1 − C),
which emphasizes that the reﬂective forecast does summarize the available information in deter-
8If mt =0 ,t h e nAt =0in equation (20) below.
9It is beyond the scope of this paper, but one might consider the situation where the reﬂective forecast is based
on agent fractions estimated with some imprecision. For example, a loose interpretation of the updating equations
(24) is that the fraction following a strategy can be estimated from its recent payoﬀs.
10mining yt. Substituting (13) and noting that y∗
t satisﬁes (7) yields
yt = y∗
t + α−tntmt. (14)
T h em a r k e tp r i c eyt deviates from the price y∗
t implied by the true fundamentals to the extent that
a nonzero fraction nt of the agents not following the reﬂective forecast are in fact following the
mystical forecast.
4E v a l u a t i n g F o r e c a s t s
Once yt is realized, agents are in a position to evaluate their current strategies, and there are
several possible criteria.10 We adopt the squared error criterion in light of its long tradition in
the econometrics literature for evaluating forecasts. LeBaron et. al. (1999) make the same choice.
Brock and Hommes (1998), on the other hand, use current realized trading proﬁts. They also
suggest a more general weighted average of trading proﬁts that includes accumulated wealth as
another case. Hommes (2001, p. 156) shows that the trading proﬁts criterion does not take into
account risk, but that the squared error criterion can be derived from the utility function (5) for a
mean-variance optimizing risk averse agent. Gaunersdorfer, Hommes, and Wagener (2003) replace
the trading proﬁts payoﬀ in Brock and Hommes (1998) with a squared error payoﬀ function and
derive qualitatively similar results.
We assume that agents attempt to forecast dt + yt rather than just yt because dt + yt is the
total return to holding an asset with price yt−1 in period t − 1. The agents share the common
expectation Et−1dt for dt so their forecasts for dt are identical. Using (10), (11), and (13), the
forecasts of yt from period t − 1 are given by:
fγ,t−1(yt)=Et−1y∗
t,
fλ,t−1(yt)=Et−1y∗
t + α−tmt−1,
fβ,t−1(yt)=Et−1y∗
t + α−tnt−1mt−1.
10Blume and Easley (1992) discuss some issues involved in choosing payoﬀ functions in the context of an evolutionary
study of asset pricing. They are concerned with long run survival of strategies.
11The reﬂective forecast error can be decomposed using (14) as Ut = Ft + Gt,w h e r e
Ft = dt + y∗
t − Et−1(dt + y∗
t) (15)
is the innovation in the fundamentals and
Gt = α−t(ntmt − nt−1mt−1) (16)
is the innovation in the weighted martingale. Using the notation At−1 = α−tmt−1, the fundamen-
talist and mystical forecast errors can be expressed as Ut +nt−1At−1 and Ut −(1−nt−1)At−1.W e
let σ2
F denote the variance of Ft, and, to focus unambiguously on other sources of heteroskedas-
ticity, we assume this variance is constant over time. The process Ft will be serially independent
regardless of the structure of the dividend process.
The payoﬀs are the negatives of the squared forecast errors:
πβ,t = −U2
t , (17)
πγ,t = −U2
t − 2nt−1At−1Ut − n2
t−1A2
t−1, (18)
πλ,t = −U2
t +2( 1− nt−1)At−1Ut − (1 − nt−1)
2 A2
t−1. (19)
The terms involving At−1 appear because the realized price depends on At−1 to the extent that
some agents follow the mystical forecast. The diﬀerences in the squared forecast errors depend on
the product of At−1 and Ut and the square of At−1.
Any of the three forecasts could have the best payoﬀ in a particular period, and the ordering
depends on the realizations of At−1 and Ut. The ordering πλ,t > πβ,t > πγ,t can occur if the term
2(1− nt−1)At−1Ut in the payoﬀ to mysticism is positive (the mystic has conjured a fortuitously
accurate forecast) and suﬃciently large. Similarly, πγ,t > πβ,t > πλ,t can occur if the term
2nt−1At−1Ut is suﬃciently negative. If At−1Ut is suﬃciently small in absolute value, then πβ,t is
greater than both πγ,t and πλ,t.
The reﬂective forecast has a natural advantage that we can express in terms of the ﬁtness of a
12given strategy, which is the diﬀerence between a given strategy’s payoﬀ and the population average
payoﬀ. Using the period t−1 population shares of agents following the forecasts that produce the
realized payoﬀsi np e r i o dt, the average payoﬀ is ¯ πt = βt−1πβ,t + γt−1πγ,t+ λt−1πλ,t.T h e ﬁtness
of the reﬂectivist forecast is given by
πβ,t − ¯ πt =( 1− βt−1)nt−1 (1 − nt−1)A2
t−1 ≥ 0. (20)
The reﬂectivist payoﬀ is thus unambiguously better than the average payoﬀ.
The nature of the contest between fundamentalism and mysticism is captured by
πλ,t − πγ,t =2 At−1Ut − (1 − 2nt−1)A2
t−1. (21)
If fundamentalism has a large following (nt−1 is near zero), then the term involving A2
t−1 favors
continued domination by fundamentalism. A large positive At−1Ut could, however, reverse this
tendency. Mysticism has a symmetric advantage if nt−1 is near one, and that advantage could be
reversed by a large negative At−1Ut.
5E v o l u t i o n
To translate the relative payoﬀs into changes in agents’ beliefs we adopt a behavioral process from
evolutionary game theory known as “imitation of successful agents.”11 T h en a m ee m p h a s i z e st h a t
the payoﬀs of other agents aﬀect an agent’s probability of switching strategies. This contrasts with
strategies where agents focus only on their own payoﬀs.
Imitation of successful agents can be developed within a more general model of how agents
review and change forecasting strategies. Let rj,t be the fraction of agents using forecast j who
review their choice of strategy at time t, and let pi
j,t be the probability that a reviewing agent using
forecast j in period t switches to forecast i i nt h en e x tp e r i o d . W el e txt =( βt,γt,λt) denote the
vector of population shares, and we will use xi,t to reference the elements of this vector. If there
11Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996), Hofbauer and Weibull (1996), and Weibull (1997) develop imitation of successful
agents. DeLong, Schleifer, Summer, and Waldman (1990) use another form of imitation in their noise trader model.
13are k available forecasts, then the change in xi,t is given by
xi,t+1 − xi,t =
k X
j=1
rj,txj,tpi
j,t − ri,txi,t. (22)
This is a discrete time version of equation (4.25) in Weibull (1997). We assume that all agents
review every period regardless of the payoﬀ so rj,t ≡ 1, but that the transition probabilities pi
j,t
depend on the performances of the strategies. Agents will tend to switch to strategies with better
payoﬀs, meaning lower squared forecast errors. We assume that agents arrive at the transition
probabilities using payoﬀ weighting functions w(πi,t) to calculate
pi
j,t =
w(πi,t)xi,t
wt
, (23)
where wt =
n P
h=1
w(πh,t)xh,t. The transition probability pi
j,t into strategy i depends on its current
popularity xi,t a n do ni t sc u r r e n tp a y o ﬀ w(πi,t) relative to the population weighted average wt.
Substituting (23) into (22) with rj,t ≡ 1 yields the equation of motion for the population shares
xi,t+1 = xi,t
w(πi,t)
wt
. (24)
The speciﬁc dynamics of the system will depend on the functional form of w(·).
In particular, the dynamics of the system depend on the convexity of the weighting function
w(π).I f w(π) is linear, the evolution of the fractions xi,t follows the replicator dynamic as the
fractions change proportionally with the ﬁtness (payoﬀ relative to the population average) of a
given strategy. For example, if w(π)=τ + π for a constant τ, then (24) can be written as
xi,t+1 = xi,t
τ + πi,t
τ + πt
. (25)
Given (20), βt is monotone increasing, leaving no opportunity for the emergence of mysticism
because γt and λt will be forced to their minimum possible values. (For Case 2 and Case 3
discussed in the next section, γt + λt is small, but positive.) No ﬁnite value for τ can guarantee
that τ + πi,t and τ + πt in (25) are positive, however, and setting w(π) to some positive constant
14κ if τ + πi,t ≤ κ does introduce a convexity into w(πi,t). A convex weighting function provides
conditions that can lead agents to adopt the mystical forecast. Simulations (not reported in this
paper) show that the prospects for heterogeneous expectations depend on the value of τ,w h i c h
determines how frequently the constraint τ + π ≥ κ is binding.
To explore the relation between convexity in the payoﬀ weighting function and convergence of
expectations, we base our analysis in this paper on the exponential weighting function
w(π)=eθ2π, (26)
where θ parameterizes the convexity of the function. Compared to the linear weighting function
underlying the replicator dynamic, convexity of the weighting function means the population shares
change overproportionally with the ﬁtness of the strategies12. In economic terms, greater convexity
of w(π) implies that agents are seeking out the best performing strategy more aggressively.
We derive in the appendix approximations for the equations of motion for βt and
nt = λt/(λt + γt) that qualitatively characterize how the properties of the updating functions
depend on the convexity θ.F o r βt, when the accumulated martingale innovations have not yet
made A2
t−1 large, we have
βt
βt+1
∼ = 1 − θ2(1 − βt)nt−1 (1 − nt−1)A2
t−1(1 − 2θ2U2
t ). (27)
Note that
βt
βt+1
< 1 implies that reﬂectivism’s share is increasing. The fraction βt following
reﬂectivism will fall, making it possible for fundamentalism or mysticism to gain followers if agent
aggressiveness θ and the squared forecast error U2
t for the reﬂective forecast are suﬃciently large.
The nature of the contest between the fraction λt following mysticism and the fraction γt
following fundamentalism can be seen in an approximation to the equation of motion for nt:
nt
nt+1
∼ = 1 − 2θ2(1 − nt)(At−1Ut +( nt−1 − 1
2)A2
t−1). (28)
This equation of motion inherits properties noted for the simple diﬀerence in the mystical and
12Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) examine the speciﬁcation of the weighting function in detail.
15fundamental forecast payoﬀs (21). If nt−1 is near zero or one, then the factor nt−1 − 1
2 acts to
put the weight of the squared martingale A2
t−1 toward reinforcing that value of nt−1. Reversing
that trend requires a large value for At−1Ut of the appropriate sign. For example, if nt−1 is less
than 1
2, then mysticism gains relative to reﬂectivism if At−1Ut is a large positive number with
At−1Ut > −(nt−1 − 1
2)A2
t−1. (A symmetric result for gains in fundamentalism applies if nt−1 is
greater than 1
2.) Mysticism thus gains overall if a large squared forecast error U2
t in (27) causes
ad e c r e a s ei nr e ﬂectivism and a large product At−1Ut in (28) appears to show that the martingale
predicts the forecast error. The factor θ2 in both (27) and (28) causes the magnitude of the changes
to be in proportion to the square of agent aggressiveness θ. A greater value for θ2 reduces the
number of consecutive fortuitous martingale realizations it would take to propel mysticism to a
given popularity.
Imitation of successful agents diﬀers from the evolutionary mechanism Brock and Hommes
(1997) refer to as the discrete choice model.13 That model, which is a close relative of the multino-
mial logit model, can be written as
xi,t+1 =
w(πi,t)
Pk
j=1 w(πj,t)
,
where w(πi,t)=eβπi,t and β is the “intensity of choice,” which is similar to our measure θ of agent
aggressiveness. A fraction xi,t cannot reach 0 under the discrete choice model although for high
levels of β the fractions can become very small. The steady states for this model will, therefore,
be interior to the simplex containing the vector xt. Convergence to homogeneous expectations is
not possible.
Imitation of successful agents (24), on the other hand, has the property that x1,t/x2,t decreases
if w(π1,t) <w (π2,t). Inferior strategies can be driven to zero popularity because xi,t+1 depends
on xi,t in (24). The factor xi,t appears because the transition probability in (23) depends on
popularity, as measured by xi,t.I n f a c t , i f pi
j,t = xi,t in (23), then we would have a model of pure
imitation, where agents choose a new strategy by randoming picking another agent and adopting
13Brock and Hommes (1997) introduced the discrete choice model as a method for studying the evolution of
heterogeneous expectations in a cobweb model. They extend this approach to the asset pricing framework discussed
here in Brock and Hommes (1998). Chiarella and He (2002) is one of many extensions.
16that person’s strategy. Imitation of successful agents, as generated by (23), assumes that agents
switching strategies consider both current payoﬀs and popularities. The latter can be thought of
as measuring the quality of a strategy’s previous payoﬀs because a strategy gains in popularity to
the extent it secures a series of favorable payoﬀs.
Considering the possibility of convergence to homogeneous expectations is thus reasonable under
imitation of successful agents. The central question will be whether that outcome is robust to the
introduction of small fractions of agents using alternative strategies.
6 Convergence of Expectations
We have constructed an evolutionary model of expectation formation in order to consider whether
expectations converge and, if they do not, to characterize the nature of the resulting heterogeneous
expectations. We will show that persistent heterogeneous expectations are more likely if agents
are more aggressive. Two additional features of agents’ behavior are important factors.
(i) Fundamentalism might have a special appeal because it is so widely cited by learned economists.
(ii) Agents might be willing to consider new information thought by some to help predict yt.W e
analyze three cases.
Case 1: No Underlying Beliefs
If agents simply play the game as it is described to this point (without (i) and (ii) above), then
xt =( βt,γt,λt) will eventually cease changing when it reaches one of two edges of the simplex
∆ = {(βt,γt,λt)|βt ≥ 0,γt ≥ 0,λt ≥ 0, and βt + γt + λt =1 }. The evolution equation (24) shows
that xi,t =0implies xi,s =0for s ≥ t. That is, if a strategy has no followers, it cannot acquire any.
O nt h ee d g ew h e r eλt =0a n do nt h ee d g ew h e r eγt =0 , nonzero weights apply to the reﬂective
forecast and one other forecast. The two forecasts are numerically identical so there will be no
further change in xt =( βt,γt,λt). The edge where βt =0is not an absorbing state because the
fundamental and mystical forecasts will not be numerically equal and the evolution will continue
until λt =0or γt =0 . The outcome will thus be some combination of reﬂectivism and one other
strategy where the third strategy is extinct.14
14The reﬂective strategy is not well-deﬁned at the point where (β,γ,λ)=( 1 ,0,0), but the fractions cannot reach
17This ﬁrst case does not provide a very satisfying foundation for homogeneous expectations.
In the long run, the expectations will follow either the fundamental solution or the martingale
solution, but the outcome depends on the starting fractions and a period of stochastic movement
among strategies. Given the algebraic symmetry in (18) and (17), there is no meaningful diﬀerence
between fundamentalism and mysticism from the point of view of the game.
Case 2: Core Belief in Fundamentals and Averages
By augmenting the model with two assumptions about agents’ core beliefs, we can make a
strong case for convergence to fundamentals.
Condition 1 The fraction βt is bounded from below by the minimum βmin > 0.
Two arguments support the assumption that a core fraction βmin of the agents are willing to
stick with the reﬂective strategy regardless of particular realized payoﬀs. First, equation (20)
guarantees that the payoﬀ to the reﬂective forecast is at least equal to the average payoﬀ. Second,
if the process does converge to a steady state with a single dominant strategy, then the reﬂective
forecast will automatically match the winning forecast numerically, guaranteeing its followers the
maximum possible payoﬀ. C a s e1i sa ne x a m p l eo ft h i s . W h i l ew ed on o th a v ee x p l i c i tc o s t so f
evaluating or switching strategies, the reﬂective forecast avoids both while maintaining an above
average payoﬀ at all times and matching whatever forecast is eventually dominant.
Condition 2 The fraction γt is bounded from below by the minimum γmin > 0.
We attribute the core following for fundamentalism to published research in economics. A large
literature in economics attempts to justify the assumption that agents will unanimously agree on
the fundamental solution to models with forward expectations. Countless papers simply impose
this assumption. We do not assume universal belief in the fundamentalist forecast, but we do
assume that some fraction γmin of the agents choose their strategy based on published economic
research and follow the fundamentalist forecast regardless of what other agents do.
Our goal with Case 2 is to consider the possibility of convergence to the fundamentalist expec-
tation without simply imposing the assumption that γmin =1 .00. In our simulation results, we
that point in Cases 2 and 3, which are the focus of this paper.
18take both βmin and γmin to equal 0.05. We pick 0.05 to be small relative to 1.00, but large relative
to the precentage of the agents who consider the mystical forecast in Case 3 below.
For even these small ﬁgures, mysticism will eventually lose its appeal and the fractions will
move to the steady state where λt =0 . While mysticism can gain popularity when the martingale
accidentally forecasts fundamentals, any period of relatively small squared forecast errors will, ac-
cording to (27), drain followers from both mysticism and fundamentalism, increasing the following
of reﬂectivism. The limit of this process leaves a remaining core γmin =0 .05 of unyielding funda-
mentalists that outnumbers the remaining λmin =0f o l l o w e r so fm y s t i c i s m . I ti st h u st h en a t u r a l
advantage of reﬂectivism and the core of unyielding fundamentalists that lead to the collapse of
mysticism in the long run.
The mechanism that causes the eventual failure of mysticism is an important characteristic of
our model. In some models of rational bubbles, Evans (1992) and Hall, Psaradakis and Sola (1999),
for example, the bubble collapses with some exogenously given probability.15 T h ec o l l a p s ei no u r
model occurs endogenously, given the natural tendency for the fraction βt following the relective
forecast to increase and given that we take γmin to be substantially larger than λmin because the
fundamental solution is prominently featured in published economics research. Furthermore, the
collapse of mysticism requires only that agents study squared forecast errors, not that they develop
some deeper theory about minimum state variables or expectational stability.
Case 3: Evaluating New Information
The central question we address in this paper is whether the convergence to the fundamentalist
forecast in Case 2 is robust to a very small fraction of the agents evaluating new information.
In particular, suppose the agents consider the mystical forecast, which is based on a martingale
solution. We assume that the agents cannot know with certainty that the martingale is extraneous.16
In our simulation results, we study the eﬀects if λmin =0 .0001 of the agents consider the mystical
forecast. In practice, we choose λmin to be much lower than the other minima so that, if mysticism is
near its minimum, it has very little eﬀect on the asset price and yt essentially follows the fundamental
15Charemza and Deadman (1995) present an alternative model of speculative bubbles analogous to Evans (1992).
The explosive term enters additively in Evans (1992) and multiplicatively in Charemza and Deadman (1995).
16Even if the agents intend to rule out nonstationary solutions, nonstationarity tests do not yield certainty in ﬁnite
samples.
19solution. Our goal is to ﬁnd out whether, even after a very minimal beginning, mysticism can gain
suﬃcient following to impact the system, causing bubble-like behavior and inducing ARCH eﬀects
in the time series data. Our formal statement of this challenge to stability is
Condition 3 The fraction λt is bounded from below by the minimum λmin > 0. If this bound is
reached, the martingale restarts at mt =0 .17
Analyzing whether equilibria are robust to the introduction of small fractions of the population
using alternative strategies is a common topic in evolutionary game theory. Binmore, Gale and
Samuelson (1995) and Binmore and Samuelson (1999), in particular, consider the possibillity that
arbitrarily small “drift” in the population fractions can have large impacts on the outcome. Here,
we simulate the model while imposing λmin =0 .0001 to examine the stability of adherence to the
fundamental solution when a very small fraction of the agents consider extraneous information.
7 Simulation Methodology
The remainder of this paper examines the empirical properties of the per share excess return
Zt = dt + yt − α−1yt−1, (29)
which is a natural measure of investment performance. Expressing yt as (14) and noting that y∗
t
satsiﬁes (7) yields Zt = Ut + C,w h e r eUt = Ft + Gt is the reﬂectivist forecast error given by (15)
and (16) and C is the risk premium that appears in (6). Because C is constant in this paper, the
per share excess returns are (up to a constant) equal to the reﬂectivist forecast errors.
One advantage of studying per share excess returns rather than percentage returns is that
our results are invariant to the dynamic structure of the dividend process. We can simulate
the serially independent innovations to fundamentals Ft without making assumptions about the
dividend process and without actually calculating dt, yt,a n dyt−1.18
17An alternative would be have a new martingale start every period, but that would lead to a large and variable
number of strategies in a given period.
18In calculations not reported here we have checked the diﬀerences that might result from assuming a speciﬁc
dividend process in order to make possible direct calculation of dt, yt, and gross percentage returns (dt + yt −
yt−1)/yt−1. Results for gross percentage returns very similar to those in Tables 1 and 2 for excess returns can be
obtained if dividends are assumed to follow an AR(1) process with an autoregression parameter equal to 0.95.
20The conditional volatility of excess returns Zt depends on three main parameters: agent ag-
gressiveness θ, martingale volatility ση, and the volatility of fundamentals σF. We adopt the
normalization σF =1 .0 so that the volatility of the fundamentals is ﬁxed. Some normalization is
necessary because multiplying θ by a constant φ while dividing Ft, Gt,a n dAt by φ would leave the
weighted payoﬀs (26) unchanged. The normalization σF =1 .0 has the intuitive appeal of holding
the properties of fundamentals ﬁxed while focusing on agent behavior and on the nature of the
extraneous martingale.
Other parameters are ﬁxed at reasonable values that are constant across simulations. These
parameter values include the agents’ risk aversion parameter a =0 .25, the discount factor α =0 .99,
and the total supply of shares per investor zs =1 .0.
All simulations begin at the potentially stable point where reﬂectivism has its maximum number
of followers given Conditions 2 and 3. The initial fraction λmin =0 .0001 of the population using
the mystical forecast is much lower than the other minima, γmin =0 .05 and βmin =0 .05.W h i l e
we assume that one agent in 20 is an unyielding believer in the true fundamentals, we assume that
only one agent in 10,000 is attracted to a mystical forecast under ﬁrst consideration. The initial
minimum fraction following fundamentalism thus dominates the initial fraction following mysticism,
making the reﬂectivist forecast nearly identical to the fundamentalist forecast. These initial values
are intended to ensure that the ARCH eﬀects in the simulated data do not arise spuriously from
the size of the initial fraction following mysticism.
If, after some initial increase, the following λt for the mystical forecast again falls to the minimum
λmin, we implement Condition 3 by allowing λt to remain at λmin and resetting the martingale to
mt−1 =0 .T h i s e ﬀectively represents a new mystical forecast. The model in this paper could be
extended to include many diﬀerent mystical forecasts operating simultaneously, but we focus on a
single mystical forecast for clarity. An alternative approach, which is common in the computational
ﬁnance literature (LeBaron (2000, 2006)) would be to regularly introduce new strategies into the
population.
218 Volatility Clustering and Excess Kurtosis
Volatility clustering and fat tails are two of the most striking properties of excess returns in ﬁnancial
market data.19 In this section, we explore the relation between these phenomena on the one hand
and agent aggressiveness and the variance of the martingale innovation on the other.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show typical realized simulations for the model. The top graph in each
ﬁgure is the realized share price.20 The second graph shows the per share excess return. The
bottom three graphs show the shares of the population using each strategy across time.
Figures 1 and 2 ilustrate the dramatic diﬀerences between cases where agents basically agree
on a single forecast and cases where agents hold heterogeneous, evolving expectations. Figure
1( ση =1 .0, θ =0 .5) shows a case where mysticism plays no role. The population share for
mysticism remains at its minimum, and the asset price remains close to the fundamental solution.
Figure 2 (ση =1 .0, θ =1 .0) shows how mysticism becomes a factor when agents are more
aggressive. There are periods when mysticism succeeds in attracting adherents, becoming the
dominant strategy at times. Stretches of time when mysticism dominates often show bubble
behavior in the asset price and large deviations from zero in the excess returns. Such bubbles
do not, however, last indeﬁnitely. As we note in Section 6, the unyielding fraction γmin following
fundamentals is much larger than the minimum fraction λmin for mysticism, and reﬂectivism has a
natural advantage. These two factors lead to an eventual collapse of mysticism.
Figure 3 (ση =2 .0, θ =2 .0) shows a further increase in martingale volatility suﬃcient to cause
briefer, but more decisive episodes of mysticism. Volatility clustering in the returns is quite evident
and occurs around short outbursts of mysticism. Engle (2001) suggests that clusters of large shocks
must be the result of news. We can interpret our simulations as agents temporarily responding to
a new variable, but quickly discarding it as irrelevant. Mysticism can gain a large following but it
usually lasts for less than 10 periods before it is rejected. Outbreaks of mysticism that last longer,
as shown in Figure 2, tend to occur for more moderate values of θ and ση.
To formally conﬁrm the volatility clustering apparent in these ﬁgures, we also calculate Engle’s
19Pagan (1996).
20As we note in the previous section, we need the variance of the innovation to fundamentals, but not a speciﬁc
dividend process to calculate excess returns and the fractions βt, γt,a n dλt. To calculate realized share price for the
graph, we use the auxiliary assumption that dividends follow an AR(1) process with autoregression parameter 0.95.
22(1982) test for ARCH in the simulated returns (29), setting the lag parameter to 5.21 The critical
value for Engle’s test for ARCH is 11.07. The test statistics for Figures 1, 2, and 3 are 2.68, 39.01,
and 62.83, respectively.
Table 1 gives a more comprehensive view of some features of the simulated data. The four panels
show degrees of agent aggressiveness, and the rows within the panels show degrees of martingale
volatility. Each entry in the ﬁrst column shows the percentage of the sample runs, out of 10,000
trials, for which one would reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity using the 0.05 critical
value for Engle’s test with the lag parameter set to 5. Column 2 shows the average estimate of
the long memory parameter d for the Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) estimation procedure for
squared excess returns. Column 3 shows the average kurtosis over the trials. The three columns
on the right show the average percentage (over all trials and all periods) of the agents following
each of the three forecasting strategies.
The basic ﬁnding in Table 1 is that agent aggressiveness and martingale volatility both con-
tribute to the likelihood of diagnosing ARCH and excess kurtosis in the simulated data. Agent
aggressiveness, parameterized by the curvature of the payoﬀ function, is clearly important. If the
parameter θ determining agent aggressiveness is less than 1.00, there is no evidence of ARCH for
any level of martingale volatility. For θ ≥ 1.00, however, ARCH is a dominant feature of the data
as agents aggressively switch forecasts searching for the optimal strategy.
For a ﬁxed level of agent aggressiveness θ, Table 1 shows that mysticism is more likely to be
an important factor for a large ση. Small martingale innovations lead to small diﬀerences in the
payoﬀs ((17), (18) and (19)), making the likely gains in popularity for mysticism small even when
At−1 does match the sign of Ut. For a larger martingale innovation variance, fortuitious values for
At−1 have a greater chance of causing large diﬀerences in the payoﬀsa n dg a i n sf o rm y s t i c i s m .
The estimates of the long memory parameter for squared excess returns, on the other hand, show
no indication that long memory is an important feature of the simulations.22 Several sets of results
that are not reported in Table 1 also show no evidence of long memory. The serial correlation
21E n g l e ’ st e s ti saj o i n tt e s to ft h ec o e ﬃcients of the ﬁrst k lags of the squared residuals in a regression on the
current squared residual. Calculations for a range of alternative values for k show that the results are not particularly
sensitive to this parameter for our simulations.
22Pagan (1996, p.30) notes the common ﬁn d i n go fl o n gm e m o r yi ne m p i r i c al squared excess returns.
23coeﬃcients for squared and absolute excess returns have the pattern that, in cases where the ﬁrst-
order serial correlation is noticeably greater than zero, the higher order serial correlations drop
toward zero faster than is consistent with long memory. The long memory parameter estimates
for the absolute value of excess returns are similar to those for squared excess returns, but smaller.
For excess returns , the estimates of d are all very near zero.
The most striking feature of the population fractions in Table 1 is that the average percentage
following mysticism does not have to be very large to induce ARCH. For θ =1 .0, the average
fraction following mysticism is less than 0.015 in all cases even though the probability of rejecting
homoskedasticity is as high as 0.700. In no case in Table 1 does the average fraction following
mysticism exceed 0.12.
9G A R C H
A natural next step is to examine the simulated data that showed ARCH eﬀects to see whether
it is well represented by a GARCH (Generalized ARCH) model. GARCH models, introduced by
Bollerslev (1986), are commonly used to examine ﬁnancial market data and oﬀer a useful extension
of the ARCH approach. We examine the simulated data with the GARCH(1,1) model that Engle
(2004) terms “the workhorse of ﬁnancial applications.”23 This approach models the conditional
variance of the errors Et−1
¡
ε2
t
¢
= σ2
R,t as
σ2
R,t = κ + ϕσ2
R,t−1 + ψε2
t−1, (30)
where κ, ϕ,a n dψ are constants. The conditional variance depends on the previous period’s
conditional variance and on the previous period’s squared error. The advantage of this speciﬁcation
is its parsimony. It does not require multiple lags of ε2
t, and it separates the eﬀects of the long
term conditional variance σ2
R,t−1 and the short term squared errors ε2
t−1. Of course it is possible
to include further lags of either variable, but, as Engle (2001) notes, the GARCH(1,1) model has
proved suﬃcient for most ﬁnancial market data.
Table 2 reports estimation results for GARCH(1,1) models for the data described for Table 1.
23Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992) survey GARCH modeling in ﬁnance.
24Following the organization of Table 1, each section of the table gives results for a given level of
agent aggressiveness, and each row summarizes the results for a given standard deviation of the
martingale innovation. Each row is calculated using 1,000 sample runs of 1,000 periods. All the
reported statistics are calculated for just those simulations for which Engle’s test rejects the null
of no ARCH, making the GARCH results conditional on a preliminary diagnosis of ARCH.
T h ee s t i m a t eo fϕ is the best initial indication of whether the data is well represented by (30).
For those cases where Engle’s test rejects the null of no ARCH, Column 1 gives the conditional
probability that a signiﬁc a n c et e s tf o rt h ee s t i m a t eo fϕ will reject the null of zero, implying that
the conditional variance is serially dependent. Columns 2 gives the mean of the estimates of ϕ for
the cases where H0 : ϕ ≤ 0 is rejected.
We also report rejection probabilities for H0 : ψ ≤ 0 in Column 3. The probability in Column 3
is conditional on the Engle test rejecting the null of no ARCH and the test of ϕ rejecting H0 : ϕ ≤ 0.
Column 4 shows the mean of the estimates of ψ where the null is rejected. Finally, we conduct
a diagnostic test (Enders (2004, p. 136)) for serial correlation in the squared residuals, using a
Ljung-Box Q test on the runs for which ϕ is signiﬁcantly greater than zero. The ﬁnal column
reports the percentage of the runs for which the Q test rejects the null of no serial correlation in
the squared error terms.
We draw two main conclusions from Table 2. First, as in Table 1, agent aggressiveness θ
and martingale volatility ση are both important in determining the relevance of a GARCH(1,1)
empirical model. For small values of these parameters, few trials are diagnosed as having ARCH
by Engle’s test and, for those few trials for which the null of no ARCH is rejected, the frequency of
rejecting H0 : ϕ ≤ 0 is modest. For larger values of θ and ση, the probability of rejecting H0 : ϕ ≤ 0
is over 0.5 in several cases. For those cases, the probability of rejecting H0 : ψ ≤ 0 is near one and
the probability that the diagnostic test ﬁnds serial correlation in the squared residuals is near the
nominal 5% size of the test. For several rows in Table 2, therefore, there is a good chance that
standard econometric tests would support the conclusion that the data is GARCH(1,1).
Second, Table 2 hints at the empirical appeal of generalizing the basic ARCH/GARCH models.
At the highest level of agents aggressiveness θ =4 .0 and for the larger values of martingale volatility
ση, the results for Engle’s test in Table 1 are decisively in favor of ARCH. For those same parameter
25values, Table 2 does not lend much support to ﬁtting a GARCH(1,1) model. The probability of
rejecting H0 : ϕ ≤ 0 is relatively low, as is the mean of the signiﬁcant estimates of the ARCH
autoregression parameter ϕ in the two rows for the larger values of ση. While the rejection
probabilities for the diagnostic test are not large for any rows of the table, the larger rejection
probabilities occur for the higher values of agent aggressiveness θ. These results point in the
direction of a more extensive search over the generalized family of ARCH models.
Overall, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that letting agents choose among competing fore-
casts can produce ARCH/GARCH eﬀects that are very similar to those found in data for ﬁnancial
markets. We can decompose the parameter combinations of martingale volatility and agent ag-
gressiveness into three regions. For low martingale volatility and/or low agent aggressiveness, the
process is nearly always at the fundamentalist solution. For somewhat higher martingale volatility
and/or agent aggressiveness, mysticism becomes an important factor, the data frequently exhibit
symptoms of ARCH, and a GARCH(1,1) model often ﬁts the data very well. For very high martin-
gale volatility and very aggressive agents, Engle’s (1982) test for ARCH rejects the null hypothesis
decisively, but the volatility in the system cannot always be adequately modeled by a GARCH(1,1)
model. In this situation, econometricians committed to an ARCH approach would likely construct
a model more complex than GARCH(1,1).
10 Conclusion
While ARCH/GARCH models have proved to be extremely successful empirical econometric tech-
niques, explaining the underlying causes of conditional volatility in ﬁnancial markets has been a
diﬃcult challenge. This paper presents a formal model explaining how such eﬀects arise endoge-
nously when forward-looking agents choose among forecasting strategies.
The leading candidate for the source of conditional volatility has long been news of some kind
(Engle (2001, 2004)). Our results are driven by the arrival of new information, but they do not
require any assumption that information arrives at nonuniform rates. We show instead that the
process of experimenting with and rejecting sources of information can be a key factor explaining
conditional volatility. In fact, our parameter specifying how aggressively agents search for the
26optimal forecasting strategy is a primary factor in accounting for conditional volatility.
Our results do not require any radical departure from rationality. We consider only forward-
looking mean-variance optimizing agents who diﬀer only because they choose among three forecast-
ing strategies that are all consistent with the notion of rational expectations. The fundamentalists
use the rational expectations solution dominant in that literature. Mysticism follows the same
principles, but mistakenly experiments with the idea that the martingale innovations are funda-
mental. Both fundamentalism and mysticism are, of course, only fully rational if they are adopted
by all agents. The reﬂectivists focus on this point and adopt a forecast taking full account of the
behavior of the other two groups of agents.
The characteristics of the realized asset price diﬀer dramatically across parameter values. If
the martingale variance is small or agents are not very aggressive in pursuing the optimal fore-
casting strategy, agents tend to agree numerically on the fundamentalist forecast and there is little
evidence of volatility clustering. For larger martingale variances and/or more aggressive agents,
ARCH/GARCH eﬀects appear in signiﬁcant fractions of the sample runs.
Econometric tests of the simulated data in the latter cases detect ARCH and GARCH eﬀects
similar to those found in ﬁnancial market data. We test for ARCH using Engle’s (1982) test
and then estimate the GARCH(1,1) model often used in practice. For a range of martingale
volatility and a range of agent aggressiveness, the sample statistics indicate that the simulated
data is well represented by a GARCH(1,1) model. For the combination of a large martingale
innovation variance and very aggressive agents, the evidence points in the direction of ARCH, but
in a form more complicated than a GARCH(1,1) model. As we propose in the introduction to this
paper, these results conﬁrm that empirical ARCH/GARCH eﬀects can be an artifact of viewing
data generated by heterogeneous expectations from the perspective of a model that assumes a single
expectation.
One implication of these results is that a test for ARCH can be viewed as a speciﬁcation test
for the assumption that agents agree on a single expectation. ARCH will be observed if the levels
of martingale volatility and agent aggressiveness are high enough to make divergent expectations
a common feature of the data. From this perspective, the widespread econometric evidence in
favor of ARCH/GARCH for variables such as inﬂation, interest rates, exchange rates, and returns
27on ﬁnancial assets presents a challenge to the assumption that agents in models explaining these
variables agree on a single expectation.
28Appendix
To derive the approximate equations of motion (27) and (28), it proves convenient to turn (24)
upside-down to produce
xi,t
xi,t+1
=
wt
w(πi,t)
.
For βt this becomes
βt
βt+1
=
βtexp(θ2πβ,t)+γtexp(θ2πγ,t)+λtexp(θ2πλ,t)
exp(θ2πβ,t)
,
which can be written as
βt
βt+1
= βt + γtexp(θ2(πγ,t − πβ,t)) + λtexp(θ2(πλ,t − πβ,t)).
A two-term Taylor series approximation to each exponential function (about At =0 ) yields
βt
βt+1
∼ = 1+γt(θ2(πγ,t − πβ,t)) + λt(θ2(πλ,t − πβ,t)) +
γt
2
(θ2(πγ,t − πβ,t))2 +
λt
2
(θ2(πλ,t − πβ,t))2.
Substituting
πγ,t − πβ,t = −2nt−1At−1Ut − n2
t−1A2
t−1
and
πλ,t − πβ,t =2( 1− nt−1)At−1Ut − (1 − nt−1)
2 A2
t−1
from (17), (18), and (19) introduces a variety of terms involving At−1 and Ut. We retain the terms
involving A2
t−1 and A2
t−1U2
t . The terms involving At−1Ut cancel. We leave out the terms involving
A3
t−1Ut on the grounds that their expectation is near zero.24 We leave out the terms involving
A4
t−1 on the grounds that they will be dominated by the terms involving A2
t−1 for small variances
of the martingale innovation, especially early in the history of the martingale.25 Our approximate
24The weights in the martingale innovation in Gt change between period t−1 and period t, leaving open a tenuous
possibility of some correlation with the lagged martingale.
25We consider values of ση as large as 4.0, and this approximation does not apply to such large martingale innovation
variances. This point has no eﬀect on our results because the simulations use the complete nonlinear equations of
motion, not the approximations in this appendix.
29equation describing the motion of βt is thus
βt
βt+1
∼ = 1 − (1 − βt)(θ2nt−1 (1 − nt−1)A2
t−1 +2 θ4nt−1 (1 − nt)A2
t−1U2
t ).
The equation of motion (28) for nt follows from
nt+1 =
λtw(πλ,t)
λtw(πλ,t)+γtw(πγ,t)
.
If nt+1 > 0 and w(πλ,t) > 0, some rearrangement yields
nt
nt+1
=1+( 1− nt)
µ
w(πγ,t)
w(πλ,t)
− 1
¶
.
(If w(πλ,t)=0 ,t h e nnt+1 =0 .) If the payoﬀ weight w(πγ,t) for fundamentalism is less than the
payoﬀ weight w(πλ,t) for mysticism, then nt = λt/(γt + λt) increases. A one-term Taylor series
approximation about πβ,t for each exponential function yields
nt
nt+1
∼ = 1 − 2(1 − nt)
w0(πβ,t)
w(πβ,t)
(At−1Ut +( nt−1 − 1
2)A2
t−1).
The factor w0/w measures curvature of the payoﬀ weighting function, which we identify as agent
aggressiveness. The potential for large changes in nt depends on this measure of agent aggressive-
ness.
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36Table 1
Volatility Clustering and Excess Kurtosis
Prob of Long Memory Average Average Population Shares
Rejecting Parameter d Kurtosis Fund. Myst. Refl.
ση Ho : no ARCH (sq. exc. ret.) γ t λ t β t
0.5 0.042 0.000 3.00 0.051 0.000 0.949
1 0.043 0.000 3.00 0.052 0.000 0.948
2 0.042 -0.001 3.00 0.053 0.000 0.947
4 0.046 0.000 3.01 0.055 0.000 0.945
θ=1
0.5 0.098 0.023 3.18 0.531 0.015 0.454
1 0.282 0.055 3.84 0.609 0.013 0.378
2 0.643 0.029 5.75 0.659 0.007 0.334
4 0.700 0.007 9.02 0.649 0.003 0.348
θ=2
0.5 0.156 0.005 3.31 0.300 0.102 0.599
1 0.821 0.008 4.68 0.364 0.108 0.529
2 0.993 -0.002 7.64 0.412 0.070 0.519
4 0.997 -0.009 16.64 0.374 0.033 0.593
θ=4
0.5 0.060 0.002 3.15 0.136 0.103 0.762
1 0.513 0.001 4.03 0.168 0.118 0.715
2 0.992 0.001 6.76 0.168 0.083 0.749
4 1.000 0.000 14.88 0.136 0.044 0.820
θ=1/2
Prob of Long Memory Average Average Population Shares
Rejecting Parameter d Kurtosis Fund. Myst. Refl.
ση Ho : no ARCH (sq. exc. ret.) γ t λ t β t
0.5 0.042 0.000 3.00 0.051 0.000 0.949
1 0.043 0.000 3.00 0.052 0.000 0.948
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1 0.282 0.055 3.84 0.609 0.013 0.378
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1 0.821 0.008 4.68 0.364 0.108 0.529
2 0.993 -0.002 7.64 0.412 0.070 0.519
4 0.997 -0.009 16.64 0.374 0.033 0.593
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The ﬁrst column is the fraction of the runs where the null of no ARCH is rejected at the 5%
signiﬁcance level. The second and third columns are the average long memory parameter d for
squared excess returns and the average kurtosis. The 3 columns on the right show the average
followings for each strategy, where the average is over both time periods and simulation trials.
Each row is based on 10,000 simulations.
37Table 2
Estimates of GARCH(1,1) Models
Conditional Conditional Conditional
Prob of Mean of Prob of Mean of Rejection
Rejecting Estimates Rejecting Estimates Prob
ση Ho : ϕ= 0 of ϕ Ho : ψ=0 of ψ Q test
0.5 0.150 0.771 0.333 0.044 0.000
1 0.087 0.731 0.250 0.048 0.000
2 0.139 0.742 0.200 0.041 0.200
4 0.182 0.622 0.300 0.067 0.000
θ= 1
0.5 0.258 0.747 0.708 0.053 0.042
1 0.483 0.760 0.884 0.060 0.055
2 0.672 0.642 0.973 0.085 0.055
4 0.601 0.509 0.988 0.138 0.059
θ= 2
0.5 0.348 0.696 0.704 0.064 0.111
1 0.350 0.442 0.997 0.178 0.080
2 0.702 0.198 1.000 0.493 0.039
4 0.586 0.104 1.000 0.838 0.048
θ= 4
0.5 0.258 0.822 0.375 0.034 0.000
1 0.193 0.621 0.790 0.087 0.084
2 0.222 0.223 0.996 0.390 0.086
4 0.281 0.110 1.000 0.859 0.075
θ= 1/2
Conditional Conditional Conditional
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The ﬁrst column is the fraction of the runs where the GARCH parameter ϕ is signiﬁcantly
positive, conditional on the presence of ARCH eﬀects. The following column shows the mean of
the estimates of ϕ for the runs where ARCH eﬀects are present and ϕ is signiﬁcantly positive. The
next column shows the fraction of the runs where the ARCH parameter ψ is signiﬁcantly positive,
conditional on ARCH eﬀects being present and ϕ being signiﬁcantly positive. The following column
shows the mean of the estimates of ψ where ARCH eﬀects are present and ψ and ϕ are signiﬁcantly
positive. The last column shows the fraction of the runs rejected by the diagnostic Q test among
those that had ARCH eﬀects and a signiﬁcantly positive ϕ. Each row is based on 1,000 simulations.
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